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FUTURE INTERESTS-RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION-OPTION TO REPURCHASE 
AT A FIXED PRICE-Shortly after his second marriage in 1925, plaintiff 
deeded a house and two lots to the parents of his first wife. The grantees, 
along with the plaintiff, had occupied the premises since the first wife's 
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death. The deed contained a provision that "if the second parties do not 
wish at any time to use the property as a home, the first parties shall have 
the first privilege to purchase the above described property at any future 
time at the price stated in this deed, viz., $4,000." In 1952, after the 
death of both grantees and when the property was worth $12,000, plaintiff 
tendered the purchase price to the heirs of the grantees and demanded a 
deed. Upon their refusal to convey, he brought suit for specific per-
formance, which was granted by the lower court. On appeal, held~ affirmed, 
two justices dissenting. Lantis v. Cook, 342 Mich. 347, 69 N.W. (2d) 849 
(1955). 
The majority opinion is based upon two alternative grounds: first, that 
the provision does not suspend the power of alienation under the Michigan 
statute that was effective at the date of the deed; and second, that the 
provision is not pre-emptive but creates an option to arise upon a condition 
precedent. Much confusion can be avoided by carefully distinguishing 
between the three "rules" referred to in the principal case: the Michigan 
"two lives" rule prohibiting the suspension of the power of alienation;1 the 
common law rule against perpetuities dealing with the limitation of r~ 
motely vesting future interests;2 and the common law rules which prohibit 
direct restraints on alienation.3 The Michigan "two lives" rule prohibits 
the suspension of the absolute power of alienation for a period longer 
than two lives in being at the creation of the estate.4 Because of the desir-
ability of the option as a business device5 and because this rule allows no 
period in gross6 and would, therefore, invalidate any option which was 
not measured in terms of human lives, the Michigan court has followed 
the extreme view that was originated in New York under similar legisla-
tion.7 It holds that an option does not suspend the power of alienation 
at all because there are at all times persons in being who can convey the 
fee.8 Thus, neither this nor any other option can possibly violate the 
1 Mich. Comp. Laws {1948) §§554.14, 554.15. This statute applied only to real prop-
erty and was repealed in 1949. Mich. Comp. Laws {Supp. 1952) §§554.51 to 554.53. It is 
applicable in the principal case since the deed was executed in 1926. 
. 2 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §201 {1915). 
3 COKE ON Lrrn.ETON, 19th ed., §360 (1832); 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPER.TY, 3d ed., 
§§1343-1344 (1939). . 
4 Note I supra. 
5 Though every option may have some restrictive effect upon freedom of alienation, 
it is unrealistic to think that the courts would strike down a device which has come to be 
used so widely. It has been said that the primary purpose of an option contract "is to 
enable a particular person to buy, not to prevent any one from selling." 2 SIMES, FUTURE 
INTERESTS §462 (1936). The court in the principal case (at 357) quotes this language as 
referring to pre-emptive provisions, but a careful inspection of the text shows that the 
author may have been referring to option contracts only. 
6 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPER.TY §25.18 (1952). 
7 Epstein v. Werbelovsky, 233 N.Y. 525, 135 N.E. 902 (1922); In the Matter of City of 
New York, 246 N.Y. I, 157 N.E. 911 (1927); 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §24.56 (1952). 
s Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926); Windiate v. Leland, 246 
Mich. 659,225 N.W. 620 (1929); FRATCHER, PERPETUITIES AND OTHER. Rl!srRAINTS 401 (1954). 
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"two lives" rule. Under this line of decisions the result in the principal 
case is clearly correct. However, the court goes on to say that even if this 
were not the case the provision could be sustained9 because it is not pre-
emptive at all, but an option to arise upon a condition precedent.10 The 
option is to arise when the grantees do not wish to use the property as a 
home. This is clearly valid under the common law rule against perpetui-
ties11 because, interpreting this as a negative rather than a positive act,12 
the option must arise, if at all, within the lives of the two grantees. 
Both the common law rule against perpetuities and the Michigan "two 
lives" rule were designed to cope only with "indirect" restraints on aliena-
tion. The validity of the provision in the principal case also depends 
upon the effect of the common law rules prohibiting "direct" restraints on 
alienation.18 The majority of the court argues that this provision is not 
a direct restraint because it is analogous to an option to arise upon a con-
dition precedent, while the dissent asserts that it is a pre-emptive provision 
reserving to the grantor the right to purchase at a fixed price and therefore 
is a direct restraint.14 The dilemma is in the condition itself.Hi If the 
9 This facet of the opinion is of more importance than the reiteration of the doctrine 
set forth in the Windiate cases, note 8 supra, since they were decided under the since 
repealed "two lives" rule. 
10 In the ordinary option contract to purchase land, A, the owner, usually gives B, 
a third party, the right to purchase the land for a limited period of time and at a pre-
determined price. Thus, the initiative is in B since he can force A to sell. What B has 
can probably best be described as a "power" or "legal privilege." I CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs 
§259 (1950). The fact that an option is outstanding does not prevent the sale of the land, 
but since the option holder can normally get specific performance of his contract he has 
an "equitable interest" in the land and any buyer takes subject to his option or 
interest. In the pre-emption contract, A, the owner, promises that he will not sell his land 
until he first offers it to B. Here the initiative is with A, because B has no power to 
compel a sale. A merely promises that should he desire to sell his land he will first offer 
it to B. Thus B has a "right" to buy if A desires to sell, and A is under a "duty" to 
offer his land to B should he decide to sell. Only upon the initiative of A does the option 
or power in B arise. 
11 The "right to buy at $4,000" must vest in the grantor either before or at the death 
of the survivor of the two grantees. Thus the interest is limited to lives in being at its 
creation and is within the scope of the common law rule against perpetuities. 
12 The appellants argued that the provision in the deed should be interpreted as 
requiring a positive act on the part of the grantees, "wishing not to use the property as 
a home"; thus, the provision would lapse at their deaths. However, the court construed 
the provision as a negative one so that the death of the grantees automatically gave the 
grantor the right to repurchase. 
18 Note 3 supra. 
14 It is question begging to say that a pre-emptive provision is governed by the com-
mon law rules prohibiting restraints on alienation because it is a "direct" restraint. A 
much more logical approach is to ask whether, in practice, a pre-emptive provision at a 
fixed price does tend to restrain alienation seriously. It has been so held. In re Rosher, 
26 Ch. D. 801 (1884); De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467 (1852); 4 PROPERTY REsrATEMENT 
§413, comment f (1944). It has also been said that this is not the law in Michigan. 
Fratcher, "Restraints on Alienation of Legal Interests in Michigan Property," 50 MICH. L. 
REv. 675 at 735 (1952). The Michigan Supreme Court has held that a pre-emptive pro-
vision is not a direct restraint on alienation, but these decisions were handed down 
while the "two lives" statute was in effect. Windiate v. Lorman, supra note 8; Windiate 
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grantees were required to give the grantor the right to purchase for $4,000 
whenever they should decide to sell, and if the market price were more 
than $4,000, this· would certainly be a restraint on alienation because it 
would prevent the owners from selling at a profit.16 In the principal case, 
the option arises not on the decision to sell, but on the decision of the 
owners not to use the property as a home. This, says the majority, is not 
pre-emption at all.17 It is difficult for the writer to see that these two con-
ditions are not identical in practical operation. The only possible case in 
which the decision not to use the property as a home would not coincide 
with the decision to sell, would be if the grantees sold to a third party and 
then leased back from him. To say that this is an option to arise on a 
condition precedent and not a pre-emptive provision rests on this difference. 
Edward H. Hoenicke, S.Ed. 
v. Leland, supra note 8. That a pre-emptive provision is a very real restraint on aliena-
tion is indicated by the attempted use of such provisions to prevent alienation to Negroes. 
McDermott, "The Effects of the Rule in the Modern Shelley's Case," 13 UNIV. PrIT. L. 
R:Ev. 647 at 661 (1952). 
15 It is true that an option may arise only upon the happening of a condition prece-
dent, and that it is good if this event must occur within the period of the rule against 
perpetuities. In one sense it could also be said that a pre-emptive provision arises only 
upon the happening of a condition precedent, i.e., the decision of the owner to sell. How-
ever, one normally thinks in terms of a condition which is independent or beyond the 
control of the parties involved. This is not the case here, for the "event" or condition is 
completely within the control of one party. 
16 This is the English view set forth by Pearson, J., in In re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. 801 
(1884), and followed by the Restatement. 4 PROPERTY REs'I'ATEMENT §413, comment f 
(1944). See also Kershner v. Hurlburt, (Mo. 1955) 277 S.W. (2d) 619. 
17 Principal case at 357. 
